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Nontechnical summary
This paper considers training, mobility and wages together in order to test whether firm
provided training contains a specific component. From a human capital perspective,
company training increases the productivity of a match, while from an informational
perspective, it improves the knowledge about the quality of a particular job match.
From both points of view, training is expected to influence wages, mobility, and wage
effects of mobility. Wages contain information about the productivity change or the
updated knowledge through training, and so does mobility. We use these interrelations
in order to test empirically whether training exhibits mainly general or specific human
capital in two particular ways.
First, mobility effects of training can serve as a test whether training contains a firm-
specific content but are also interesting in themselves. One reason is that mobility
can disturb the investment decision of a firm that decides about providing training.
Also, mobility can be efficiency enhancing if bad job matches are dissolved which were
detected due to training. Mobility is expected to increase or to remain unchanged if
training contains mostly general human capital, while we expect a decreasing mobility
when training is mostly specific and not portable between employers. Hence, we use
regressions explaining mobility with training participation as explanatory variable as
a first test whether training generates general or specific human capital.
As a second empirical test, we consider wage effects of mobility after training. In the
light of rent sharing between employers and employees, we expect a positive or zero
wage effect of a job change after general training, while specific capital should decrease
wages after a job change because a new employer will not reward the specific capital
that was useful in the old job. So, wage effects of mobility can be seen to discriminate
between those two forms of human capital. To evaluate the wage effects of mobility,
we use reported wages directly, but, in addition, we use the judgement of employees
whether they profited from their last job change or not, a unique feature of the dataset.
We try to identify a causal effect of training on mobility and on the wage effect of a
job change to discriminate between specific and general human capital. As proposed
by modern search theory, we take into account that mobility can be endogenous in the
wage regression. We also consider endogeneity of the training decision with respect to
the mobility decision, since there might be selection into training or mobility.
Summarising, we find empirical evidence in favour of training inhibiting job, firm or
occupation specific capital. We find that the probability of being mobile is negatively
correlated with the probability of participating in training. Further, we find that both
the partial correlation and the wage effects of (exogenous) mobility are negative for
the group of training participants, while there is no effect for the group of non-training
participants. Furthermore, using a subjective measure whether individuals profited
from their last job change or not, we find that participation in training negatively
affects the propensity to be better off after a job change.
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Abstract: This paper considers training, mobility decisions and wages together to
test for the specificity of human capital contained in continuing training courses. We
empirically analyse the relationship between training, mobility and wages in two ways.
First, we examine the correlation between training and mobility. In a second step,
we consider wage effects of mobility taking training participation into account. First,
we find that training participation is negatively correlated with the mobility decision
and that training participation decreases the probability of individuals to change the
job. Second, we find that wages are lower for job changers for the group of training
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1 Introduction
Employees can pursue various strategies over their professional life to increase their
wage. They can invest in (general or specific) human capital to increase productivity
and to be paid accordingly or they can search for better paid jobs (compare Antel
(1986)). Training and mobility decisions are not separable, they influence each other
and should be analysed simultaneously. Individuals may choose to stay with an em-
ployer after (specific) training or they may choose to change the employer after (general)
training in order to reap the benefit from training if the old employer keeps part of the
training rent.
Firms invest in training activities in order to raise the level of qualification of their
work force and to secure strong economic performance. In Germany, about 40% of
the employees obtain training during one year (see Berichtssystem Weiterbildung for
data for the year 20001). Four years before, in the years 1995/96 the participation in
training seems to have been a bit lower with about 7.1 millions members of the German
workforce participating in training (see Franz (2003)). Employees aged between 35
and 50 have the highest training participation shares. In 2001, firms in Germany
invested almost 17 billion euro in training their workforce (see Weiß (2003)). Hence,
firm provided training is considered one of the major post school investments in human
capital. Human capital plays an important role in the process of economic growth and
individuals' labour market outcomes are linked to their educational attainment. Wage
effects of training have been examined and discussed extensively in the literature (see
e.g. Pischke (2001), Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003), Buechel and Pannenberg (2004),
Juerges and Schneider (2005), and Kuckulenz and Maier (2006) for Germany or Pfeiffer
(2001) for a review of microeconometric studies). Labour turnover and training is in
the focus of fewer papers.2 This paper considers training, mobility and wages together
in order to test whether firm provided training inhibits a specific component. From
a human capital perspective, company training increases the productivity of a match,
while from an informational perspective, it improves the knowledge about the quality
of a particular job match. From both points of view, training is expected to have
positive effects on wages, and zero or negative effects on mobility, and on wage effects
of mobility. Wages contain information about the productivity change or the updated
knowledge through training, and so does mobility. We use these interrelations in order
to test empirically whether training exhibits mainly general or specific human capital
in two particular ways. More specifically, we interpret mobility effects and wage effects
of mobility in terms of the specificity of the skills that have been acquired in training
1Berichtssystem Weiterbildung VIII, Integrierter Gesamtbericht zur Weiterbildungssituation in
Deutschland, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF), Bonn
2Early work that is concerned with specific training and turnover is e.g. Oi (1962) and Deere
(1987). Newer work that deals with mobility and training, mostly in the context of frictional labour
markets, is e.g. Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (2003), Owan (2004), and Adnett, Bougheas, and
Georgellis (2004).
courses.3
The specificity of the contents of training courses is interesting for several reasons. If
firm-provided training is general there might exist a hold-up problem, a case of under-
investment. Consider the case, where an employer pays for the (general) training of
an employee under the premise that the individual is paid below marginal productiv-
ity afterwards. Clearly, the individual has an incentive to renegotiate the wage after
the investment, since the investment costs are sunk. If firms anticipate the renegotia-
tion, they will underinvest in training and there is scope for government intervention.
Second, the specificity of training investments has been discussed in the context of
international differences in labour mobility and unemployment developments (see, e.g.,
Wasmer (2003)). In this view, the specificity of human capital is central for the adapt-
ability of a system to a changing environment. If, for example, skill-biased technical
change accelerates the turbulence in an economy and therefore turnover increases, gen-
eral skills become more important, since they can be used in many firms. On the
other hand, in an economy with a low degree of turnover, a high degree of specificity
of skills might guarantee a high labour productivity. Finally, the degree of specificity
of company-provided training has also been discussed theoretically and empirically by
Krueger and Pischke (1998) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) with a focus on the
investment in training. They find that under certain conditions, firms are willing to
invest in general training and show with German survey data that indeed, part of firm-
provided training in Germany is general (see also Booth and Zoega (2001) who provide
conditions under which firms provide general training).
The paper is set up as follows. First, we derive two hypotheses in order to empirically
test whether training provides participants also with specific skills. Second, we intro-
duce and describe our data set. Third, we line out our estimation strategy. Fourth,
we describe our empirical results which are split in three parts. First, we test whether
training participation is correlated with mobility and the propensity of switching jobs.
Second, controlling for the endogeneity of job mobility we look at the wage effects of
job changes for individuals that have participated in training and for individuals that
have not. Third, we use the individuals judgement whether their last job change was
beneficial to assess the training effect on the wage effect of mobility. Finally, we sum
up, conclude and give an outlook.
2 Derivation of Hypotheses and Estimation Strategy
To our knowledge there are no theoretical models in the training literature which
explicitly show the relationship between training participation, mobility, and wage
3As argued above, training in specific skills is often observationally equivalent to training that
generates information about the quality of a particular match and that is lost upon termination of
the match. For an empirical attempt to distinguish between these two kinds of specific capital, see
Nagypál (2004).
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effects (of mobility). Nevertheless, like previous papers (e.g. Antel (1986) or Spletzer
and Loewenstein (1998)), using insights from human capital theory and search theory,
we argue that these are interrelated. The coherences between training, mobility, and
wages can be used as tests whether training exhibits firm specific human capital.
2.1 Mobility Effect of Training
The decision to invest in training on the side of the firm and on the side of the individual
is influenced by (expected) mobility. On the one hand, firms are expected to invest in
general training of the workforce only if they are able to appropriate part of the returns
to the productivity increase. This implies that firms are only then likely to invest in
general training if they can restrict workers' mobility afterwards, or if firms expect
the mobility of workers to be small.4 One reason for a low labour mobility can be
found in the existence of labour market frictions. For example, Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999) and Holzner (2005) show that in the case of the existence of frictions and wage
bargaining, it can be optimal for firms to invest in general training.5 On the other
hand, mobility might be the desired result (see, e.g., Harris and Felli (2004)). Training
might serve screening purposes and might be performed in order to distinguish good
from bad matches and sort out the bad ones (e.g., trainee programs might be partly
performed for this reason). In this case, mobility would be high after training, because
bad matches are wedded out.
If training generates a rent due to higher worker productivity, it depends on how this
rent is shared, whether the employer wants to keep the trained worker, or whether the
employee has an incentive to stay with the firm. From the employer's point of view
this means that as long as there is a rent generated by training, a firm prefers to lay off
workers that have not obtained training to those workers which have participated in
training. If a worker gains from participation in training and cannot be sure to obtain
the same wage mark up from another employer (e.g. due to asymmetric information
or specificity of training), the probability for a trained worker to quit and search for
a new job will be lower than for a non-trained worker. This implies that the effect
of training on the probability of moving between jobs reveals information about the
nature of training and rent-sharing.
For training that generates specific human capital, even in a competitive market, there
is no unique solution of how to assign the existing rent between employer and employee.
The employer might want to pay the individual a wage above the outside option in
4One reason for this might be that there are complementarities between general and specific human
capital (see e.g. Casas-Arce (2005)). In this case, the investment in general capital on the side of the
firms induces individuals to invest (more) in specific capital, and thus the mobility of the individuals
is reduced.
5The investment decision in training in the case of frictions has also been examined by Quercioli
(2005), who discusses the decision to invest in specific capital in the context of an equilibrium search
model.
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order to prevent the individual from changing the employer. It is a reasonable strategy
for an employer to provide specific training to workers and to finance this via a low
employee turnover through wages below marginal productivity and above the outside
option. Another argument for wages above the outside option is that there is a hold-
up problem, if an individual is able to extract ex-post a part of the (quasi-)rent by
renegotiating after training costs are sunk. So, negative mobility effects of training are
to be expected in case training imparts specific skills, and in the realistic case where
individuals capture a non-zero part of the return to investment in training.
If training provides individuals with general skills, this should not alter the mobility
decision in a competitive market. This is because skills are fully paid for in such a
world. If, however, the market is not competitive, the effect on mobility is less clear.
Mobility may be affected by investments in general skills since market imperfections
can turn technologically general into de facto specific skills (see Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999)). This is the case, when mobility is constrained or, when the outside wage offer
(distribution) does not increase one to one with (the productivity effect of) general
skills. It is conceivable that the employing firm does not fully recognise the general
skills from training because if the firm has paid for (part of) the training it wants to
profit from it and keep (part of) the rent. Then, there could be a mobility increasing
effect of general training if other firms are willing to pay for the increased productivity.
Hence, for training generating general human capital we expect zero or positive effects
on mobility. In the empirical application, we will interpret a zero effect of training on
mobility as training that contains only general human capital, although theoretically it
is possible that firms pay individuals their outside option in the case of specific training.
The following proposition summarizes the above arguments.
Proposition 1 If training contains only general human capital, then the mobility de-
cision of workers is unaffected if workers are paid their outside option (the competitive
case) or the mobility decision is positively affected when workers are paid below their
outside option (the rent sharing case). If training contains a specific component, the
mobility effect is expected to be negative since in general individuals are paid above their
outside option.
Estimation Strategy
We assume that the error term in the decision of being mobile is normally distributed
and therefore model the mobility decision as a Probit model. According to this model,
the probability of changing the employer depends on a vector X, which in our case con-
tains individual characteristics, job characteristics, firm characteristics and a constant,6
6Notice that both firm and job characteristics refer to the current job, i.e. the job an individual
changes to. We are aware that this is a critical assumption, but unfortunately, we do not have data
on the previous job. Therefore, we only include these characteristics as controls rather than giving an
interpretation as (causal) effects on mobility. For the standard interpretation as coefficient we would
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on a parameter vector β and on the unobservable error term .
(1) JC∗ = P (JC = 1|X,T ) +  = Φ(β′X + γT ) + 
JC = 1 means an job change, T is training participation, γ is the effect of training on
the probability to change the job, JC∗ can take the values zero and one.
The model is estimated by maximising the likelihood function as it is standard with
binary choice models, where the likelihood function is the product of the cumulated
density function (of the normal distribution) for job changers and of the survivor for
job stayers.
Note however, that training might be endogenous with respect to mobility, for example
in the case of specialisation in search or in training as suggested in Antel (1986). In
order to generate exogenous variation of the probability of training participation, we
use the training intensity by industry, estimated from an earlier wave of the dataset
in use.7 It is reasonable to assume (and can be shown empirically) that the training
intensity in 1991/1992 is uncorrelated with the wage 1998/1999, while inertia and
structural differences across industries suggest that it is (significantly) correlated with
training participation in 1999 (see table 8). Since it is easier to interpret the results,
although we estimate an Instrumental Variable Probit, too, we display the results for
a linear Instrumental Variable model.8 Further, we do not use the instruments directly
in the IV procedure, but we use the predicted values from a first stage Probit model for
training participation as instrument, since this is the optimal instrument if the model
is correctly specified and since that procedure has some nice robustness properties (see
Wooldridge (2002), p. 623ff.).9 More precisely, we estimate a Probit model for training
participation including all covariates from the job change equation plus the external
identifying variable (training intensity in 1991 by industry).10 The predicted value
from this model is then used as instrument in a standard IV approach. To be a bit
need to assume that job and firm characteristics are unaffected by the job change, which is a strong
assumption. In the empirical application, especially sectors have a strong partial correlation with
mobility, which we do not want to omit. So, basically the coefficient interpretation requires that the
job change remains in the same sector.
7Note that the common use of industry dummies and the training intensity by industry is not a
contradiction, since the training intensity is on a more disaggregated level.
8Instrumental Variable methods for Probit models are discussed for example in Newey (1987).
Results from an Instrumental Variable Probit estimation are available upon request. They do not
differ in sign and significance from the results we display here.
9In fact, we only need the linear projection of training on the set of covariates and the predicted par-
ticipation probability of the (potentially) misspecified model to depend actually on the participation
probability.
10Recognise that in a strict sense, we do not need exclusion restrictions. Although theoretically, the
functional form identifies the effect of training, in empirical work it is very common to use additional
exclusion restrictions to circumvent problems with multicollinearity.
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more formal:
(2) JC∗ = δ′X + αT + u
is the (linear probability) model to be estimated by 2SLS, where X contains a constant,
T is training participation as before and u is an error term. Again, JC∗ takes the values
zero or one. The instrument is the predicted probability for participating in training
Pˆ (T = 1|X,Z) = Φ(ζˆ ′Z + λˆ′X) deduced from a Probit model P (T = 1|X,Z) =
Φ(ζ ′Z + λ′X).
When estimating the model as 2SLS, we use a robust estimator for the variance-
covariance matrix, since standard errors are heteroscedastic by construction, when
estimating a binary response model as linear regression model.
2.2 Wage Effect of Mobility
Closely linked to the question of mobility of individuals after training participation
are wage effects of mobility if individuals have participated in training before. This is
interesting because the wage effect of a job change to a new firm reveals information
about the skills of an individual which are transferable across firms. Discussing the
wage effect of mobility after training, human capital theory predicts wage losses if
training has provided the individual with specific skills. In the case of general training,
under rent sharing, individuals might be paid below their outside option. In this case,
there could be wage gains from a job change. For this to be true, it does not matter
whether mobility is endogenous or exogenous.11
Following Loewenstein and Spletzer (2000), we interpret the empirical effect of training
on wages as an indicator for the degree of specificity of the training obtained. We test
whether workers who change their job after training are paid less than those workers
which do not change their job after training. A high wage of job movers after training
may indicate that employers share costs of and returns to general training and that
full gains from training investments can be reaped by employees at a new employer.
A low wage of job movers, in contrast, might indicate that firm (job) specific skills
are lost and productivity in the new firm is lower (see also Spletzer and Loewenstein
(1998), Pannenberg (1995), Booth and Bryan (2002) and Gerfin (2004). Hence, if
training provides individuals with specific skills and if returns are shared, a job change
after training is predicted to have a negative effect on wages. There is no theoretical
prediction for a job change without training. If a job change also invokes a negative
coefficient, then the effect of a job change after training is bigger in absolute value. In
case of general skills and the presence of rent sharing between employer and employee,
11From this point of view, individuals receive their outside option if they change jobs, independently
of whether jobtojob transitions are exogenous or endogenous.
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the predicted coefficient of a job change after training is positive or zero, because it
is not certain whether the part of the rent which is captured by the firm providing
training is also obtained by a new employer. Therefore, estimating the coefficient of
job change in a wage regression after participating in training gives a hint whether
training is mainly firm specific or general.
The following proposition summarizes the arguments.
Proposition 2 If training provides individuals with general skills, a job change after
training implies no wage change (in the case of a competitive market) or a positive wage
change if the firm captures a part of the rent generated by training (the rent sharing
case). If training also contains specific human capital, we expect the wage change caused
by job mobility to be negative since, in general, the worker will be able to extract a part
of the rent generated by specific training.
Estimation Strategy
We estimate a Mincer equation and interpret the coefficient of job change after train-
ing. In the regression we control for a variety of demographic variables, including the
variables of an enhanced Mincer equation, experience and tenure and the square of
both. We treat mobility effects for the group of training participants and individuals
that have not participated in training separately, because training participants and
non-training participants might be systematically different.
More formally, for training participants we have
(3) lnY = β′1X + β2JCT + e,
.
lnY are log earnings, X contains schooling, experience (squared), tenure (squared)
and lots of demographic variables, but also firm, job and industry characteristics and a
constant and β′1 is the coefficient vector. β2 is the influence of a job change after training
(JCT ) on earnings and e represents an unobservable error term. For non-participants
we estimate a similar equation.
There are some remarks to make, however. The above analysis assumes that in order
to consistently estimate the wage effect of jobtojob transitions after training, job
movers and stayers are similar otherwise. This is not sufficient, however, because the
decision to change a job depends on various factors such as previous training. Mobility
is endogenous if the mobility decision is taken because of the outside wage, while
mobility is exogenous when mobility takes place for reasons that do not depend on the
outside wage. It is not problematic to use exogenous mobility in a wage regression,
while the use of endogenous mobility leads to a bias.
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Notice that if individuals are paid their outside option, mobility cannot be endogenous.
If individuals are not paid their outside option and if the decision to change a job
is taken as assumed in search theory, there is an endogeneity problem. To see this,
recognise that from this point of view, the decision to change a job is made on the basis
of the current wage and outside wage offers that arrive at irregular time intervals and
that are random draws from a wage offer distribution. Hence, wage and job mobility
are determined simultaneously.
Still, involuntary job mobility is not enough to guarantee exogeneity of the job change
variable with respect to the wage, since firms might lay off people because of wages
being too high. Using information whether the partner is working and whether there
are children in schooling age helps us to identify the wage effect of exogenous and invol-
untary mobility.12 We base our analysis of wage effects of job moves both upon a com-
parison of stayers and movers accounting for endogeneity (i.e. a 2SLS approach) and
upon the direct appraisal of the individuals whether the job change ameliorated their
professional position or not.13 For all estimated models we choose a robust variance-
covariance estimator, since wages are in general assumed to be heteroscedastic.14
An alternative approach to evaluate the job change effect for training participants
and non-training participants is to use the direct subjective judgement of individuals
whether they profited from their last job change or not and to explain this dummy
variable by participation in training. Clearly, we restrict our attention to job changers
in this case. Note that there is no reason to suppose an endogeneity problem in this
case, since we restrict our attention to job changers. There would be a problem of
endogeneity if the training participation decision depended on the perceived returns to
future mobility.
3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
We use a rich data set, compiled from a representative sample of 0.1 percent of all
individuals employed in Germany. The BIBB/IAB Qualification and career survey
(Berufliche Qualifikation und Erwerbsarbeit) is jointly ascertained by the Institute
for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB Nürn-
berg) and the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut
für Berufsbildung, BIBB Berlin). The survey is implemented every seven years, but it
12Following Dustmann and Meghir (2005) and for comparison reasons, for training participants, we
have also used firm closure as instrument, yielding very similar results.
13For the same reason why a job change is endogenous in a wage regression, tenure is also endoge-
nous. By including information on the number of previous employers, however, we can account for a
source of endogeneity in tenure.
14Note that the selection in training is clearly endogenous with respect to the wage. Therefore,
analogous to Wolf and Zwick (2002) we also estimate the model including (Heckman) correction terms
from a Probit model for training participation. Since the results are virtually unaffected and since
the coefficients are even not always significant, we display the results without Heckman correction.
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is not a panel. Hence, we cannot observe and compare wages before and after training
and/or job changes directly. We will use the latest wave available, which is from the
survey in 1998/99. It comprises more than 34.000 employees.15 The cross-section data
on employed individuals in Germany contain detailed information on the qualification
and the professional career of each individual, the organisational and technological en-
vironment of jobs, and the qualifications demanded for jobs. Furthermore, information
about the employer and some personal attributes are included. Specifically, we use the
following variables (see also table 6 in the appendix for the complete list with detailed
descriptions and table 7 for a German translation of selected variables):
• The wage variable is log midpoints of earnings from 18 categories. We use mid-
points of the intervals in the same way other authors have done it (see e.g Kuck-
ulenz and Zwick (2003) or Pfeiffer and Reize (2001)).16
• The first key variable is participation in training during the last five years. The
first question is whether the individual participated in courses or seminars in
this time period. The second inquiry is on the year the last training course
took place.17 By combining both questions, we obtain dummies for participation
in training in either one specific year or in several years. Since we know when
training took place, we can use this information later to distinguish between
training before or after job changes. An important measurement problem of our
training variables is that they do not include information on the length and costs
of the training attended. Hence, we cannot control for training intensity when
estimating effects on wage and mobility.
• The second key variable is job change. We cannot directly observe this variable.
To construct the job change variable and the date of job change, we use infor-
mation on the number of employers together with the question since when one
works for the actual employer. It is also asked why people have changed the
employer and whether they profited from the job change. We use the judgement
15To discuss interrelations between training, mobility and wages, it would be optimal to use a large
panel data set where individuals are observed before and after training and job changes. For Germany,
the Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is the only available panel data set including this information. It
also provides direct information on whether training is general or firm specific. For our purpose, the
GSOEP contains too little observations, however. For example, only 4 individuals in the data set took
part in on-the-job training in 1998 and changed their job afterwards (own calculations from GSOEP
2000). This means that thorough empirical testing of our hypotheses is impossible.
16The first category includes all earnings below 600 DM, the second includes earnings from 600
DM until 1,000 DM. The following categories comprise earnings intervals of 500 DM up to 6,000 DM.
From 6,000 DM to earnings of 10,000 DM, the intervals are in steps of 1,000 DM. The next category
comprises earnings from 10,000 DM until 15,000 DM and the last category includes all earnings of
15,000 DM, and above. Most earnings can be found in the categories between 3,000 DM and 5,000
DM, see table 6 in the appendix for descriptive statistics.
17There are two questions on the participation in continuing training. First, Please think about
the last five years, i.e. the time from 1994 until today. Did you attend during that time any seminars
or courses which serve your continuous process of education? Second, In which year did the course
take place?
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of the individual whether it has profited from the employer change directly as
endogenous variable, in order to assess the effect of training on the probability
to change the job.18
• To control for selection into training in the mobility equation, we tried several
identifying variables. The results are similar for most of them. Based on theo-
retical arguments, finally, we choose the training intensity by industry, estimated
from an earlier wave (1991/1992) of the BIBB/IAB-survey. Using imputed data
from the Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS 2000) about sectoral
shares of firms and shares of firms by employment size that include continuous
training in their collective bargaining agreement, yields quite similar results.19
• As discussed above, a job change is partly endogenous in the wage regression.
In principal, there is some nice information on exogenous job change in the data
set, which we can use as instruments, namely firm closure, and occupational
changes for health or family reason.20 In the wage regression, unfortunately, these
instruments do not generate enough variation or are surprisingly not exogenous.
Hence, we use two further variables as instruments which cause variation in the
job change equation but not in the wage equation. First, we use information on
the fact whether the employed individual has a partner that is employed, too. It
is reasonable to assume (and is empirically shown) that this variable is not related
to an individuals earnings, while it is very realistic to think that the individual
is more bound to a region, so that there are less job offers and therefore less
employer changes. As a second variable, we use a dummy whether the individual
has children between 6 and 17 years. To see why, in the wage equation we control
for the number of children, since this is (significantly) correlated with the wage.
But, we think (and show) that whether the children are in schooling age or not
does affect mobility while it should (and empirically does) not affect earnings.
• Further explanatory variables are those found in the Mincer-equation, i.e. work
experience (and its square),21 job tenure (and its square), former unemployment,
and dummies for the highest educational achievement.22
• Along with these standard variables, we also include some dummies capturing
the professional status, such as blue-collar or white-collar worker, civil servant or
18Note that the job change variable not only includes direct jobtojob transitions. It also includes
for example individuals that transit through unemployment, before working for the next employer.
For comparison reasons, we have constructed a job change variable for individuals that are never
unemployed before the interview. The results do not differ by much, though.
19The CVTS data is from 1999 and therefore fits well to the BIBB/IAB data set.
20In a former version of the paper we have estimated training participation equations using job
changes as an explanatory variable and using the above instruments. In this estimation these instru-
ments worked quite nicely.
21We know when the individual started his or her first job and we include dummies for discontinu-
ation such as unemployment.
22In Germany, the highest schooling degree is more informative for the level of education than years
of schooling (see Georgellis and Lange (1997)).
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different sophistication levels of tasks.
• In addition, we use the following job characteristics: computer use, profit-sharing,
bonus payments, overtime work, whether a job is temporary, and main job con-
tents. These variables allow us to control a large part of the individual hetero-
geneity between the employees.23 Some of these variables (for example, overtime
work) can be interpreted as indicators for intrinsic motivation.
• Additional control variables explaining earnings are personal attributes. We in-
clude dummies for females, having children, and German nationality.
• Finally, we also control for the firm size and we include a dummy indicating
whether the individual lives in East or West Germany because earnings as well
as costs of living still differ between the two regions.
Hours worked vary widely in the data and we found a number of implausibly high
reported values. Therefore, we only use full-time24 employees.
During the last five years, 44 percent of the employees attended at least one continuing
vocational training course or seminar. This proves that for a large part of the employees,
training takes place. Of those workers who participated, almost 50 percent participated
last year (1998), 20 percent participated 2 years ago in the last training course or
seminar, and for the remaining employees, the last training took place more than 2
years ago. When looking at all employees, around 70 percent have changed the job
at least once, i.e. they worked at least for 2 different employers. During the previous
year, almost 12 percent of the employees changed their job.25 Several reasons why
the last job ended are distinguished in our data set. In particular, 66 percent of the
individuals state that it was their own desire to leave the former employer, 12 percent
had to leave because the firm wanted them to, 7 percent left because their fixed term
contract ended and 15 percent state that the firm went bankrupt. In their new job,
70 percent of the job changers are happier than before, for 21 percent the situation is
unchanged, and 9 percent of the individuals state that they are unhappier in the new
job than they were in the old job. Not surprisingly, out of those individuals who change
the job because it was their own desire to do so, 80 percent are happier in their new
job. Likewise, 17 percent of those individuals that did not want to leave the firm state
that the situation in the new job is worse than in the old one. Combining training
and mobility, it is interesting to know whether individuals are less likely to change jobs
after they participated in training. Given the descriptive statistics, this seems to be
23Some of these variables may also be endogenous in the earnings equation. We do not control this,
however, because the variables mainly serve as control variables for employee heterogeneity.
24We include only employees working 30 hours and above per week. We also use a dummy for
working overtime in order to take hours worked into account.
25The number of job changes is somewhat higher in our data set compared to other German data
sets (see e.g. Fitzenberger and Garloff (2005)). The reason is that we do not observe job-to-job
transitions directly and hence, some individuals which enter a new job after staying at home or after
being unemployed for a while are also included as job changers.
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the case. After 1994, 23 percent of the employees have changed their job but only 11
percent of those which took part in training during this time period changed their job
afterwards.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Mobility Effect of Training
Looking at table 1, there is a negative partial correlation between training and mobility
as individuals that have participated in training before 1997, change jobs less often after
1997 than otherwise comparable individuals. If we take into account that participation
in training might be endogenous with respect to the mobility decision, the effect of
training, instrumented by the training intensity by industries from the last wave of the
BIBB/IAB survey, increases in absolute value (compare training coefficient in tables
1 and 2).26 If an individual has more than two previous employers, this increases the
probability of a job change and points to the fact that the number of previous job
changes is an important predictor for future job changes. This is in accordance with
specialisation in search or specific training as proposed by Antel (1986) or with the
hobo syndrome by Ghiselli (1974), where employees have an intrinsic motivation to
change jobs after some years.
Interpreting and comparing the point estimates of the two approaches, means that
exogenous training participation has, on average, a bigger negative partial correla-
tion with labour mobility than training participation in the population. That is, if
somebody is admitted exogenously to training, he or she is more likely to stay in the
firm. This is counterintuitive and contradicts the Antel (1986) story where people are
assumed to specialise in training or search.
Because of this counterintuitive result, we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for
exogeneity of training given the instruments. We fail to reject exogeneity for the
instruments in use. From this we conclude that we should not overinterpret the IV
results and we prefer the Probit results. Summarising, the results point to a negative
effect of training on mobility. This is consistent with training inhibiting specific capital
for the employer or the match which would be lost upon job change.
26To see that there might be an endogeneity problem, recognise that an individual who wants to
change the employer has no incentive to invest in employer specific human capital. The number
of observations slightly differs between the two approaches, since there are some differences in the
industry classification between the two waves. The first stage results are printed in the appendix (see
table 8).
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Table 1: Does training affect labour mobility?
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Training before 1997 -0.092∗ (0.046)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.555∗∗ (0.040)
Professional Experience -0.051∗∗ (0.008)
Professional Experience Squared 0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Unemployment 0.497∗∗ (0.035)
Age -0.040∗∗ (0.006)
Lower Secondary School -0.003 (0.044)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences 0.055 (0.083)
High School Diploma 0.116 (0.071)
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.070 (0.117)
Without Professional Degree -0.131∗ (0.054)
University for Applied Sciences 0.090 (0.092)
University 0.231∗ (0.092)
Other Controls
Not Married, East Germany, Household Size (3), Sex, Children, Chil-
dren's Age (3), Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman, Tem-
porary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), White-Collar
Worker, Economic Sectors (4), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incentive Wage,
Working Hours, Partner Employed, Firm Failure, Occupational Change
(2), Restructuring, Need for Training
Intercept 0.287 (0.203)
N 9335
Log-likelihood -3721.979
χ2(48) 1640.665
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 2: IV estimates of the effect of training on job mobility
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Training before 1997 -0.510∗ (0.251)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.126∗∗ (0.012)
Professional Experience -0.017∗∗ (0.002)
Professional Experience Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Unemployment 0.128∗∗ (0.010)
Age -0.009∗∗ (0.001)
Lower Secondary School -0.025† (0.015)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences -0.003 (0.023)
High School Diploma 0.021 (0.021)
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.030 (0.032)
Without Professional Degree -0.039∗∗ (0.015)
University for Applied Sciences 0.016 (0.025)
University 0.036 (0.027)
Other Controls
Not Married, East Germany, Household Size (3), Sex, Children, Chil-
dren's Age (3), Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman, Tem-
porary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), White-Collar
Worker, Economic Sectors (4), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incentive Wage,
Working Hours, Partner Employed, Firm Failure, Occupational Change
(2), Restructuring, Need for Training
Intercept 0.487∗∗ (0.062)
N 8915
R2 0.022
F (48,8866) 36.879
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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4.2 Wage Effect of Mobility
As a second empirical test, we consider wage effects of mobility after training. In
the light of rent sharing between employers and employees, we expect a positive or
zero wage effect of a job change after general training, while specific capital should
decrease wages after a job change because a new employer will not reward the specific
capital that was useful in the old job. As expected after the first test result, we
find here that both estimates, the partial correlation as well as the wage effect of an
employer change, for the subgroup of training participants are negative (see tables 3
to 4). Both least squares and IV-methods yield a significant negative coefficient and
the effect increases in magnitude when endogeneity of the employer change is taken
into account.27 An exogenous job change is associated with a higher wage loss than an
endogenous job change, where individuals decide voluntarily to change the job on the
basis of a wage comparison, as we would expect. Clearly, in the individuals' decision
to change a job the wage that an alternative job would pay, plays a crucial role. This
is confirmed by our results. The fact that both endogenous and exogenous employer
changes yield a wage loss for the group of training participants was predicted from the
hypothesis that training incorporates a substantial share of employer or job specific
capital. This confirms the results from the previous section. Recognise however, that
the difference between the IV estimator and the OLS estimator implies that there is
endogenous mobility, pointing to the fact that a simple human capital interpretation
is not admissible.
Since search theory predicts a negative effect of job changes also in the absence of
specific capital,28 we also consider the population of non-training participants and wage
effects of job changes in this group (see tables 10 to 12 in the appendix). The correlation
between the job change variable and the wage is not significantly different from zero.
Taking endogeneity of employer changes into account and using a dummy variable for
whether the partner is employed and for the age of children as instruments, again yields
an insignificant coefficient for job change. Summarising, (exogenous) job changes seem
to have no significant effect on wages for the group of non-training participants (this
confirms the results in Pannenberg (1995). This finding is consistent with individuals
being paid their outside option on average.
Finally, we use information, where individuals judge themselves whether they profited
from their last job change (see table 5). A Probit model for the group of job changers
with training (before the job change) as explanatory variable yields a negative coef-
ficient, which is significant. Note that a specialisation in training or search does not
predict endogeneity of training in this equation, because it predicts a correlation be-
tween job change and training but not a correlation between the wage change through
27Again, the number of observations differs because of some missing values for the instruments. The
first stage estimation can be found in the appendix (see table 9).
28This is the so called wage ladder effect, the effect from self-selection in higher paying jobs.
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Table 3: Participants in training: Correlation of job change and wages
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Job Change after Training -0.028† (0.016)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.004 (0.010)
Professional Experience 0.003 (0.002)
Professional Experience Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Company Tenure 0.007∗∗ (0.002)
Company Tenure Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Unemployment -0.063∗∗ (0.010)
Age 0.008∗∗ (0.002)
Lower Secondary School -0.059∗∗ (0.013)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences 0.069∗∗ (0.016)
High School Diploma 0.063∗∗ (0.018)
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.004 (0.036)
Without Professional Degree -0.087∗∗ (0.030)
University for Applied Sciences 0.098∗∗ (0.020)
University 0.225∗∗ (0.021)
Other Controls
Not Married, Foreigner, Handicapped, East Germany, Household Size
(3), Sex, Children, Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman, Tem-
porary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), Professional
Position (4), Economic Sectors (47), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incentive
Wage, Working Hours
Intercept 7.215∗∗ (0.101)
N 4552
R2 0.546
F (85,4466) 65.048
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
a job change and training.29 We conclude that training participation seems to have
a negative effect on the propensity to improve upon the perceived position through
a jobtojob change. In our view, this is the most convincing test because it is the
most direct evidence on the specifity of training substance. It supports our result that
training inhibits specific human capital, which is lost when switching to a different job.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed the effects of training on mobility and the effect of training on
the wage effects of mobility. We used these results to interpret the degree of specificity
29In addition, we found in the mobility estimation that the null hypothesis of exogeneity could not
be rejected, so that this sort of endogeneity is probably not present.
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Table 4: Participants in training: IV estimates of the effect of a job change on wages
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Job Change after Training -0.077∗ (0.035)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.004 (0.010)
Professional Experience 0.004 (0.002)
Professional Experience Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Company Tenure 0.005† (0.003)
Company Tenure Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Unemployment -0.062∗∗ (0.010)
Age 0.009∗∗ (0.002)
Lower Secondary School -0.056∗∗ (0.013)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences 0.063∗∗ (0.016)
High School Diploma 0.062∗∗ (0.017)
Without School Leaving Certificate 0.003 (0.035)
Without Professional Degree -0.077∗∗ (0.029)
University for Applied Sciences 0.092∗∗ (0.020)
University 0.215∗∗ (0.021)
Other Controls
Not Married, Foreigner, Handicapped, East Germany, Household Size
(3), Sex, Children, Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman,
Temporary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), White-
Collar Worker, Economic Sectors (47), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incen-
tive Wage, Working Hours, Firm Failure, Occupational Change (2)
Intercept 7.194∗∗ (0.107)
N 4488
R2 0.55
F (87,4400) 64.166
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
of training. All in all, the results suggest that there are both a negative correlation
of training with job change and a negative effect of training on job change. As far
as the wage is concerned, there are stable causal negative effects of both employer
and occupational changes on wages for the group of training participants. For the
group of non-training participants there is no significant relationship between a job
change and wages, thereby suggesting that individuals are on average paid their outside
option. This suggests that training indeed has a specific component which is lost for
exogenous and endogenous, for voluntary and involuntary job changes. Note, that this
is also consistent with the idea that training generates information on the quality of a
particular match.
Using the direct judgement from job changers whether they profited from job change or
not, seems to bear the best information however, since it is easier to find the adequate
control group. We can easily take the group of individuals that has profited from a
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Table 5: Effect of training on subjective change in the position after an employer change
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Occupational Change after Training -0.133† (0.074)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.169∗ (0.076)
Professional Experience -0.033∗ (0.014)
Professional Experience Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Company Tenure -0.020 (0.105)
Company Tenure Squared 0.017 (0.023)
Unemployment -0.398∗∗ (0.068)
Age -0.007 (0.010)
Lower Secondary School 0.074 (0.075)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences -0.040 (0.145)
High School Diploma -0.069 (0.122)
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.007 (0.193)
Without Professional Degree 0.148 (0.097)
University for Applied Sciences -0.145 (0.150)
University -0.300∗ (0.153)
Other Controls
Not Married, Foreigner, Handicapped, East Germany, Household Size
(3), Children, Sex, Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman,
Temporary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), White-
Collar Worker, Economic Sectors (47), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incen-
tive Wage, Working Hours, Partner Employed, Occupational Change (2),
Restructuring, Need for Training
Intercept 1.104 (0.836)
N 3260
Log-likelihood -1204.629
χ2(85) 273.812
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
job change and compare training participants and non-participants. Here, we find that
training reduces the probability of an amelioration through a job change. Thus, from
this view, too, training can be interpreted as incorporating employer (job) specific
human capital.
Summing up, the evidence points to the fact that most training seems to generate some
specific capital. This specific capital can be existent as a real productivity increase in
the respective firm or, equivalently, as information about the quality of the match. Our
findings are somewhat in contradiction to recent findings that most training is general,
but it may well be the case that training provides both, firm specific and general human
capital. Future work should try to capture better the heterogeneity of training and
distinguish between various kinds of training when testing for specificity.
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A Appendix
Table 6: List of variables used
Variable Share/ Notes
Average
School Attainment
Without School Leaving Certificate 2.01%
Lower Secondary School 36.45%
Intermediate Secondary School 35.56% Reference category
Entrance to
University for Applied Sciences 7.24%
High School Diploma 18.73%
Vocational Training
Without Professional Degree 10.15%
Full-Time Vocational School 2.22% Several years of professional training
in school; reference category
Dual Apprenticeship 59.30% Several years of professional training
in school and on-the-job
Master Craftsman 10.46%
University for Applied Sciences 6.42%
University 10.66%
Training
Courses and Seminars 43.86% Participation in courses and seminars
during the last 5 years
Courses and Seminars before 1997 16.77% Participation in courses and seminars
before 1997
Professional Career
Professional Experience 21.02 years Years from first job until today
Company Tenure 11.76 years Years from starting to work for
a company until today
Unemployment 30.37% Dummy = 1 if a person was
ever employed, otherwise 0
Professional Status
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker 11.90% Worker without professional degree
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 18.53% Worker with degree from
dual apprenticeship system or
full-time vocational school;
Reference category
Assistant Foreman 2.52%
Master/Foreman 2.18%
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 3.68%
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Table 6: List of variables used (continued)
Variable Share/ Notes
Average
White Collar-Worker With
Simple Tasks 8.35%
White Collar-Worker With
Difficult Tasks 18.57%
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 19.50%
Executive White-Collar Worker 5.53%
Job Change 69.40%
Job Change after Training 11.26% Dummy = 1 if there is job change
after training, Dummy = 0 if there
is training and no job change after
Training1 23.54% Dummy = 1 if training takes place
before possible job change, Dummy = 0
if there is no training
Job Change (1984 - 1994) 63.91% Job Change between 1984 and 1994
Job Change after 1994 22.64%
Training before 1997 16.77%
Occupational Change 32.90%
Occupational Change after Training 5.80%
Task Change 28.86%
Task Change after Training 9.22%
Number of Employers 5 Categories: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more employers
Task Change after Training 9.22%
Occupational Change (Health) 1.81% Occupational Change for Health Reasons
Occupational Change (Family) 2.64% Occupational Change for Family Reasons
Firm Failure 14.72%
Workplace Characteristics
Computer Work Station 54.59% Work routine includes using
the computer
Temporary Work 7.77%
Overtime 78.50% Dummy = 1 if a person works
overtime, otherwise 0
Profit-Sharing 7.64%
Incentive Wage 19.13%
Working Hours 4.14
Job Content 13 Categories: training, testing,
procurement, organisation, marketing,
developing, manufacturing,
negotiating, supervising, research,
repairing, counselling, monitoring
Individual Characteristics
Children 45.39% Dummy = 1 if a person has at
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Table 6: List of variables used (continued)
Variable Share/ Notes
Average
least one child, otherwise 0
Child<6y 14.92% Dummy = 1 if a person has at
least one child below 6 years, otherwise 0
Child6to17y 28.94% Dummy = 1 if a person has at
least one child above 6 and
below 17 years, otherwise 0
Child6to17y 10.84% Dummy = 1 if a person has at
least one child above 18 years, otherwise 0
Foreigner 5.43% Dummy = 1 if a person does
not have a German Nationality,
otherwise 0
Not Married 8.42%
Female 32.24%
Handicapped 3.78%
Partner Employed 38.51%
Size of Household 3 Categories: 2, 3 or 4 household members
Identifying Variables
Technical Restructuring 24.68%
Organisational Restructuring 15.77%
Restructuring 2.33 Number of restructuring measures (1997/98)
Need for Training 1.13 Number of areas with a subjective
need for training
Instrument1 9.05 Share of firms, where training is part of
the collective agreement (industrial level)
Employer Characteristics
Size of Firm 7 Categories: number of employees
is 1-4, 5-9, 10-49 (reference
category), 50-99, 100-499, 500-999,
and 1000 and more
East Germany 19.80%
Economic Sector 47 Categories
Trade Sector 12.30%
Industrial Sector 25.80%
Private Household Sector 0.36%
Public Service Sector 26.95%
Handcraft Sector 17.45%
Agricultural Sector 1.34%
Good Economic Situation 80.82% Dummy = 1 if the company is in a good
economic situation, otherwise 0
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Table 7: Translation of selected variables
English German
Training
Quality Circle Qualitätszirkel
Trade Fair Fachmesse
Internship Praktikum
Lecture Fachvortrag
Specialist Literature Fachliteratur
School Attainment
Without School Leaving Certificate Ohne Abschluss
Lower Secondary School Hauptschule
Intermediate Secondary School Realschule
Entrance to Fachhochschulreife
University for Applied Sciences
High School Diploma Abitur
Vocational Training
Without Professional Degree Ohne Ausbildung
Full-Time Vocational School Berufsfachschule
Apprenticeship Lehre
Master Craftsman Meister
University for Applied Sciences Fachhochschule
University Universität
Professional Status
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Angelernter Arbeiter
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker Facharbeiter
Assistant Foreman Vorarbeiter
Master/Foreman Meister
Unskilled White-Collar Worker Ausführender Angestellter
White-Collar Worker with Simple Angestellter mit einfacher Tätigkeit
Tasks
White-Collar Worker with Difficult Angestellter, der schwierige Aufgaben nach allgemeiner
Tasks Anweisung selbständig erledigt
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker Angestellter, der selbständige Leistungen in
verantwortungsvoller Tätigkeit erbringt oder begrenzte
Verantwortung für die Tätigkeit anderer trägt
Executive White-Collar Worker Angestellter mit umfassenden Führungsaufgaben und
Entscheidungsbefugnissen
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade Beamter im einfachen oder mittleren Dienst
Civil Servant in Higher Service Beamter im gehobenen Dienst
Civil Servant in Senior Service Beamter im höheren Dienst
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Table 8: First stage: Probit model for participation in training
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Training in 1991 0.416∗ (0.176)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.108∗∗ (0.033)
Professional Experience 0.030∗∗ (0.006)
Professional Experience Squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Unemployment 0.099∗∗ (0.033)
Age 0.004 (0.005)
Lower Secondary School -0.156∗∗ (0.038)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences -0.068 (0.067)
High School Diploma 0.007 (0.057)
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.097 (0.111)
Without Professional Degree -0.220∗∗ (0.054)
University for Applied Sciences -0.037 (0.073)
University -0.066 (0.072)
Other Controls
Not Married, East Germany, Household Size (3), Sex, Children, Full-
Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman, Temporary Work, Computer
Work Station, Size of Firm (6), White-Collar Worker, Economic Sectors
(4), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incentive Wage, Working Hours, Partner
Employed, Occupational Change (2), Restructuring, Need for Training
Intercept -2.588∗∗ (0.180)
N 12578
Log-likelihood -4981.645
χ2(41) 1042.041
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 9: First stage: Probit model for employer change.
Children between 6 and 17 and employed dummy for
partner as instruments
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Partner Employed -0.225† (0.122)
Child6to17y 0.116 (0.086)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.144 (0.092)
Professional Experience -0.020 (0.018)
Professional Experience Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Company Tenure -0.379∗∗ (0.081)
Company Tenure Squared -0.032∗ (0.013)
Unemployment 0.371∗∗ (0.076)
Age 0.008 (0.013)
Lower Secondary School 0.038 (0.104)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences -0.182 (0.137)
High School Diploma 0.087 (0.120)
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.009 (0.252)
Without Professional Degree -0.078 (0.163)
University for Applied Sciences -0.069 (0.145)
University -0.233† (0.140)
Other Controls
Not Married, Foreigner, Handicapped, East Germany, Household Size
(3), Sex, Children, Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman,
Temporary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), White-
Collar Worker, Economic Sectors (47), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incen-
tive Wage, Working Hours, Partner Employed, Occupational Change (2),
Firm Failure, Restructuring, Need for Training
Intercept 0.877 (0.628)
N 5026
Log-likelihood -868.111
χ2(87) 775.61
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 10: Non-participants in training: Correlation be-
tween job change and wages
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Job Change after 1994 -0.002 (0.012)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.042∗∗ (0.008)
Professional Experience 0.006∗∗ (0.002)
Professional Experience Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Company Tenure 0.007∗∗ (0.002)
Company Tenure Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Unemployment -0.053∗∗ (0.008)
Alter 0.005∗∗ (0.001)
Lower Secondary School -0.026∗∗ (0.009)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences 0.081∗∗ (0.018)
High School Diploma 0.060∗∗ (0.015)
Without School Leaving Certificate 0.009 (0.023)
Without Professional Degree -0.086∗∗ (0.011)
University for Applied Sciences 0.126∗∗ (0.023)
University 0.241∗∗ (0.023)
Other Controls
Not Married, Foreigner, Handicapped, East Germany, Household Size
(3), Sex, Children, Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman, Tem-
porary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), Professional
Position (2), Economic Sectors (47), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incentive
Wage, Working Hours, Occupational Change (2)
Intercept 7.541∗∗ (0.081)
N 9305
R2 0.422
F (86,9218) 69.367
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 11: First stage: Probit model for employer change.
Children between 6 and 17 and employed dummy for
partner as instruments
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Partner Employed 0.327∗∗ (0.112)
Child6to17y -0.449∗∗ (0.134)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 1.091∗∗ (0.085)
Professional Experience 0.241∗∗ (0.017)
Professional Experience Squared -0.005∗∗ (0.000)
Company Tenure 1.755∗∗ (0.111)
Company Tenure Squared -0.466∗∗ (0.021)
Unemployment 0.491∗∗ (0.076)
Age 0.018† (0.010)
Lower Secondary School 0.078 (0.091)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences 0.183 (0.161)
High School Diploma -0.047 (0.125)
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.388† (0.223)
Without Professional Degree -0.305∗∗ (0.096)
University for Applied Sciences -0.094 (0.193)
University -0.016 (0.167)
Other Controls
Not Married, Foreigner, Handicapped, East Germany, Household Size
(3), Sex, Children, Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman,
Temporary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), White-
Collar Worker, Economic Sectors (47), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incen-
tive Wage, Working Hours, Occupational Change (2)
Intercept -0.600 (0.470)
N 10723
Log-likelihood -904.771
χ2(87) 893.680
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 12: Non-participants in training: IV estimates of the effect of job change on
wages
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Job Change after 1994 -0.013 (0.014)
Individual Characteristics
More than two Previous Employers 0.043∗∗ (0.008)
Professional Experience 0.006∗∗ (0.002)
Professional Experience Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Company Tenure 0.006∗∗ (0.002)
Company Tenure Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Unemployment -0.053∗∗ (0.008)
Age 0.005∗∗ (0.001)
Lower Secondary School -0.026∗∗ (0.009)
Entrance to University for Applied Sciences 0.081∗∗ (0.018)
High School Diploma 0.060∗∗ (0.015)
Without School Leaving Certificate 0.008 (0.023)
Without Professional Degree -0.087∗∗ (0.011)
University for Applied Sciences 0.126∗∗ (0.023)
University 0.242∗∗ (0.023)
Other Controls
Not Married, Foreigner, Handicapped, East Germany, Household Size
(3), Sex, Children, Full-Time Vocational School, Master Craftsman, Tem-
porary Work, Computer Work Station, Size of Firm (6), Professional
Position (2), Economic Sectors (47), Overtime, Profit-Sharing, Incentive
Wage, Working Hours, Occupational Change (2)
Intercept 7.545∗∗ (0.081)
N 9305
R2 0.422
F (86,9218) 69.381
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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